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Abstract 
The potential benefits of accurate targeting are substantial because public expenditures can 
be concentrated to the needy, thereby saving money and improving program efficiency. 
However, targeting also entails the administrative costs associated with identifying, 
reaching, and monitoring potential beneficiaries. In addition, there are also potential costs 
in the form of disincentive costs, stigma costs, and political economy costs. The experience 
of the recent Indonesian social safety net programs shows that targeting was one of the 
most difficult problems in the implementation of these programs. As a result, the programs 
were plagued by the twin problems of undercoverage and leakage. 
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I.  Benefits and Costs of Targeting 
In social safety net, social protection, or poverty reduction programs, targeting 
issues are frequently among most difficult problems to deal with during the 
implementation of such programs. Nevertheless, targeting is almost always a prominent 
feature of the designs of such programs because the potential benefits of effective targeting 
are considerable. Targeting can concentrate expenditures allocated to the programs on 
those who need them most, hence saving money and improving program efficiency.
1
 In 
addition, given the budgetary and time constraints facing program implementers, it is 
highly desirable that expenditure on social sectors should be fine-tuned and well-targeted. 
Figure 1 illustrates the benefits of accurate targeting. In the horizontal axis, 
individuals are ordered from the poorest to the richest. The vertical axis, meanwhile, 
measures the levels of income of these individuals. The dashed curve OR maps these 
individuals to their income levels. The line PS represents the poverty line. Clearly 
individuals between O and T are poor as their income levels are below the poverty line. 
Suppose the government institutes a poverty elimination program by giving each and every 
individual an income supplement by the amount of OP. A program like this, where all 
individuals receive the benefits of the program, is called a “universal intervention”. As a 
result of the intervention, the income curve shifts up to PQ so that nobody is poor as no 
part of the new income curve is below the poverty line. The cost of this program is area A 
plus area B plus area C.  
If the objective of the program is to eliminate poverty, however, a universal 
intervention achieves “too much”. Consider area C. This is the total amount of benefits 
given to individuals whose income levels were already above the poverty line even before 
the intervention. Hence, this area C can be considered as a “leakage”. Now consider area 
B. This is the part of the benefits given to the poor which makes their post-intervention 
income levels higher than the poverty line. Hence, this area B can be considered as an 
“excess”. It is only area A which is considered as “efficient”. This is the part of the 
benefits given to the poor which is just sufficient to eliminate poverty. 
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Now suppose an alternative poverty elimination program is designed with the 
following features: (i) only the poor receive the benefits of the program, and (ii) the 
benefits are just sufficient to lift their income levels to meet the poverty line. An 
intervention like this is called a “targeted intervention”. With perfect targeting, the post-
intervention income curve is PUR and the cost of the program is only area A. This means 
that compared to universal targeting, targeted intervention gives a saving of area B plus 
area C, which can be considered as the benefits of targeting.  
The examples illustrated in Figure 1, however, are extreme cases. In reality, a 
universal intervention which gives each and every individual the same benefit rarely exists. 
Similarly, a perfect targeted intervention is very hard to find. A much more common 
variant of universal targeting is what is called a “broad targeting” program. This is a 
program which provides general subsidies to certain goods or basic services which are 
considered to matter more to the poor than to the non-poor. Experience from Indonesia 
shows that spending on primary education tends to favor the poor, where the subsidy per 
capita declines as living standards rise. On the other hand, the spending on tertiary 
education and hospitals results in the opposite pattern, while the spending on community 
health center seems to have a neutral effect across socio-economic levels (van de Walle, 
1998).  
While targeting has large potential benefits, it also always entails costs. The costs 
include the administrative costs of identifying, reaching, and monitoring potential 
beneficiaries. In addition, there are potential additional costs in the forms of disincentive 
costs, stigma costs, and political economy costs.
2
 Disincentive costs are possible 
economic losses due to disincentive effects. For example, a program provides an income 
supplement of Rp. 20,000 for anybody whose income level is below Rp. 100,000 per 
month. Those with income levels between Rp. 100,000 and Rp. 120,000 per month may 
reduce their working hours so that their income levels fall to slightly below Rp. 100,000 
per month, making them eligible to receive the benefits of the program. Privately they 
become better off, but the society as a whole loses from lower output and the increased 
costs of the program.  
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Stigma costs can arise when program beneficiaries lose their self-esteem because 
they regard themselves as failures who have been forced to rely on government support. In 
addition, non-beneficiaries may have negative attitudes toward beneficiaries and treat them 
as second-class citizens. As a result, some of those who are actually eligible to receive the 
benefits of a program may refuse to accept their entitlements. Hence, the objectives of the 
program may not be achieved.  
Political economy costs, meanwhile, are any loss of political support for a program 
which may render the program ineffective. Often the poor are the most difficult and costly 
to reach. On the other hand, the most vocal and organized groups in society are often not 
the poor. If a program is well targeted, the latter group may voice their opposition to the 
program and stifle its implementation. Faced by such a dilemma, there is a danger that 
government will “go easy”, diverting the benefits to vocal and organized groups, 
abandoning the program’s poverty alleviation objectives. 
 
II.  Approaches and Mechanisms of Targeting 
Normally, as the accuracy of targeting increases, the benefits from targeting will 
also increase, but so will the associated costs.
3
 Hence, targeting should be carried out only 
as long as the benefits exceed the associated costs. This, however, is easier said than done. 
Often it is very difficult to quantify all the benefits and costs that are involved. In addition, 
there are many practical questions which need to be answered regarding the 
implementation of targeting. This section specifically deals with the question of what 
targeting mechanisms are available to reach the intended beneficiaries of a program.  
The intended beneficiaries of social safety net, social protection, or poverty 
reduction programs depend upon the objectives of the particular program. A food 
assistance program will want to target its benefits to those within the community who are 
having difficulties obtaining food out of their own resources. A health assistance program 
will aim to provide free or subsidized medical benefits to those with health problems who 
are also poor or who are unable to access medical services without outside assistance. 
Meanwhile, a public works program will aim to provide employment opportunities to 
either all of the currently unemployed or those among the unemployed who are also poor. 
Normally a public works program is not designed to encourage the poor who are already 
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working to switch jobs. The strategy on how to reach these intended beneficiaries should 
be a central element of any program design.  
The targeting mechanism issue is also complicated by the fact that poverty is a very 
fluid condition, where people frequently move in and out of poverty as a result of various 
external factors. Many households, while not currently in poverty, recognize that they are 
vulnerable and that events could easily push them into poverty in the future — for example 
a bad harvest, a lost job, an unexpected expense, or an illness. Therefore, targeting 
‘transient’ or recent poverty may not provide a solution to the time-invariant ‘chronic’ 
poverty. 
In general there are two types of targeting mechanisms, administrative targeting 
and market-based targeting. In administrative targeting, the beneficiaries of a program 
are selected by the program implementers. Two approaches are commonly used in 
administrative targeting, geographic targeting and household or individual targeting. 
Geographic targeting simply means selecting particular regions or areas in which the 
benefits of a program will be distributed. The selection is usually based on a set of 
indicators, by which all regions are ranked from the most to the least eligible to be 
included in the program.  
Geographical targeting has its advantages and disadvantages. It is easy to 
implement and to monitor, typically involves less fraud and much lower administrative 
costs than other targeting mechanisms, and requires only limited information at the 
individual or household level. However, some benefits will inevitably leak to the non-poor 
who reside in the targeted areas, while the poor who reside in non-target areas will not be 
covered (Bigman and Fofack, 2000). 
Household or individual targeting is basically an effort to identify households or 
individuals who are deemed eligible to receive the benefits of a program. The selection of 
households or individuals can be based on means testing or based on a set of indicators as 
in geographic targeting. Means testing is a method of selecting individuals or households 
based on whether they pass a certain predetermined threshold. The most commonly used 
threshold is a certain level of income. In the example of disincentive effects mentioned in 
the first section, a threshold per capita income of Rp. 100,000 per month is used to screen 
individuals who are deemed eligible to receive an income supplement of Rp. 20,000. The 
problem with such ‘direct targeting’ is that screening to identify the poor is expensive. It 
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requires extensive information gathering and verification on the part of government 
administration.  
These problems have led to a variety of schemes using indicator targeting or 
intervention on the basis of the particular characteristics of the poor (‘characteristic 
targeting’). This can be considered as a form of statistical discrimination where lack of 
detailed information leads program providers to use average characteristics to target 
intended beneficiaries. Examples of indicators or characteristics that are useful good 
predictors of income include, ownership of durable goods, number of children, gender, 
age, education level, land ownership, housing characteristics, or a combination of several 
of these indicators. Data on these characteristics are relatively easier to obtain than data on 
income. Therefore, the administrative costs of characteristic targeting are much lower than 
the cost of direct targeting. In addition, they are also difficult to manipulate in the short 
run, and hence have much lower level of leakage than direct targeting. 
Market-based targeting is also often referred to as self-selection targeting. With 
this targeting mechanism, a program is designed in such a way so that only those who 
really need assistance will choose to participate in the program. For example, a food 
security program can provide in-kind benefits of very low quality food, available to 
anybody who applies for it. The very low quality food is considered an inferior good, 
where demand decreases with rising income. Although theoretically every one can apply 
for the benefits, it is expected that only the poor will apply since such low quality food will 
not be acceptable or desirable to the non-poor. Similarly, in a public works program which 
provides a wage rate level below the prevailing market wage, it is expected that only those 
who are really in need will apply to join the program. Such a low level of wages 
discourages those who are already working from applying for the program and maintains 
the incentive to take up regular employment when it become available.
4
 This self-selection 
mechanism has certain advantages over administrative criteria: it allows individuals to 
choose to participate or not and is more flexible to unobserved household shocks than 
administrative criteria.
5
  
In practice, a program can use or apply a single targeting mechanism or a 
combination of two or more targeting mechanisms. For example, a combination of 
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5
 See Sumarto et al. (2000).  
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geographic and household targeting can be used to reach the poor.
6
 Initially, the 
government project staff may select those areas where the poor are most likely to be found. 
Obviously, poverty incidence is an important indicator that can be used as a guide in this 
selection of areas. Subsequently the government may choose those households which are 
deemed eligible to receive the program benefits using means testing or particular indicators 
or characteristics. Using means testing, a household is either included or not included in 
the program based on the information and the criteria selected to determine participation. 
In order to do this, a range of methods are available including measured poverty status, 
community-based identification, and household self-reporting status.  
Community-based identification allows communities to categorize households 
within their own community as poor or vulnerable. This method is simple and inexpensive 
and accuracy can be gained by the fact that poor households are a part of the local 
community and can be readily identified. However there are certain disadvantages with 
community-based identification: communities have a tendency to overstate the number of 
poor households, community rankings are relative to community measures so that such 
rankings might not be consistent at the national level, and there is a need for some 
relatively skilled staffs to oversee this process. 
 
III.  Targeting in the Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs 
To demonstrate the way targeting be conducted, this section discusses the targeting 
that has been used recently in the Indonesian Social Safety Net Program. Table 1 lists the 
various social safety net programs established by the Government of Indonesia to mitigate 
the social impact of the recent crisis. These programs were launched in early 1998, but 
many of them did not start until the second half of the year. These programs were intended 
to help protect the pre-crisis poor as well as the newly poor as a result of the crisis through 
a fourfold strategy: (i) ensuring the availability of food at affordable prices, (ii) 
supplementing purchasing power among poor households through employment creation, 
(iii) preserving the access of the poor to critical social services, particularly health and 
education, and (iv) sustaining local economic activity through regional block grant 
programs and the extension of small-scale credit. 
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In general, the targeting for these programs was based on a combination of 
geographic and household targeting mechanisms, except for the subsidized rice program 
which used only household targeting. The targeting for some programs was based on a 
household classification created by the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency 
(BKKBN). According to this classification, households are divided into four socio-
economic status groups: ‘pre-prosperous households’ (“keluarga pra-sejahtera” or KPS), 
‘prosperous I households’ (“keluarga sejahtera I” or KS I), KS II, and KS III. The KS I to 
KS III categories are often lumped together as the KS or ‘prosperous’ category. 
A household is defined as a ‘pre-prosperous’ household if it fails to satisfy one of 
the following five conditions: (i) all household members are able to practice their religious 
principles, (ii) all household members are able to eat at least twice a day, (iii) all household 
members have different sets of clothing for home, work, school, and visits, (iv) the largest 
floor area of the house is not made of earth, and (v) the household is able to seek modern 
medical assistance for sick children and family planning services for contraceptive users.  
Suryahadi et al. (1999) find that there is a lack of correlation between this official 
classification and consumption-based measure of poverty. They find that while only 15 
percent of the ‘prosperous’ households were ‘poor’, 75 percent of the ‘pre-prosperous’ 
households were ‘non-poor’. On the other hand, 46 percent of the ‘non-poor’ households 
were ‘pre-prosperous’ and 38 percent of the ‘poor’ households were ‘prosperous’.  
There have been a number of criticisms of the use of the BKKBN lists for targeting 
purposes. These lists: do not capture transitory shocks to income as they are based on 
relatively fixed assets (such as the type of floor in the house, possession of changes of 
clothing). The lists also draws on non-economic criteria (the capacity of families their to 
meet religious obligations).  In addition, the lists are compiled by relatively poorly trained 
workers at the village level, so consistency across regions is not assured, and the 
composition of the list is susceptible to changes by local government officials.
7
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Table 1.  Areas and Major Programs of the Indonesian Social Safety Net Program 
 
Area Program Description and Benefits Targeting FY 1998/99 FY 1999/00 
Food Security  OPK program: sale of subsidized rice to targeted 
households. Eligible households can purchase 10-20 kg of 
rice at Rp. 1,000/kg (market price is Rp. 2,500 – 3,000/kg) 
Geographic 
 
None None 
Household BKKBN list BKKBN list with 
flexibility 
Community 
Empowerment  
PDM-DKE: a ‘community fund’ program that provides 
block grants directly to villages for either public works or 
revolving credit funds. 
Geographic Pre-crisis data Updated with regional 
data 
Household 
 
Local decision making Local decision making 
Employment 
Creation  
“Padat karya”: a loose, uncoordinated collection of several 
‘labor intensive’ programs in various government 
departments. 
Geographic None, various 
ministries 
Urban areas, based on 
employment 
Household 
 
Weak self selection Self selection 
Education Scholarships and block grants: providing  
 Scholarships of Rp. 10,000/month for elementary (SD) 
students, Rp. 20,000/month for lower secondary (SLTP) 
students, and Rp. 30,000/month for upper secondary 
(SMU) students 
 Block grants to selected schools 
Geographic Old data on 
enrollment 
Poverty data updated 
to 1998 
Household School committees 
applying criteria 
School committees 
applying criteria 
Health  
 
JPS-BK: a program providing subsidies for  
 Medical services 
 Operational support for health centers  
 Medicine and imported medical equipment  
 Family planning services  
 Nutrition (supplementary food)  
 Midwife services 
Geographic BKKBN pre-
prosperous rates 
Pre-prosperous rates 
updated to 1999 
Household BKKBN list BKKBN list with 
flexibility 
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 The subsidized rice and the health programs explicitly used this BKKBN 
household classification for targeting. The selection of recipients in the scholarship 
program was also intended to take into account their BKKBN household status. Originally, 
eligible recipients for some JPS programs were only KPS card holders, but for certain 
programs, for example the OPK program, eligibility was extended to include KS I 
households as well. 
The padat karya programs consisted of quite diverse programs and although specific 
programs were targeted to particular areas (such as drought areas), the lack of coordination 
meant that in effect there was little or no systematic geographic targeting of this set of 
programs. Within these labor ‘intensive’ programs there were a variety of disagreements 
about the desired characteristics of intended participants but typically the beneficiaries 
were not chosen according to any fixed administrative criteria.  Hence, to the extent that 
there was targeting, it was primarily through self-selection. Only those who were willing to 
work should have been able to receive the benefits.  
In the scholarship program, scholarship funds were at first allocated to schools so 
that “poorer” schools received proportionally more scholarships. In each school, the 
scholarships were then distributed to individual students by a school committee, which in 
theory consisted of the principal, a teacher representative, a student representative, the 
head of the parent association as the representative of community, and the village head. 
The selection of scholarship recipients was based on a combination of various 
administrative criteria, which included a number of factors, such as household data from 
school records, family BKKBN status, family size, and the likelihood of students dropping 
out of school.
8
  
School students in all but the lowest three grades of primary school were officially 
eligible. In principle, students selected to receive the scholarships were supposed to be 
from the poorest backgrounds. As a guidence, scholarships were to be allocated at first to 
children from households in the two lowest BKKBN rankings. If there were more eligible 
students then the number of scholarships available, then additional indicators were to be 
used to identify the neediest students. These additional indicators included the distance 
from home to school, physical handicaps, and those children coming from large or single 
                                                          
8
 Extensive monitoring  of the education program revealed, however, that the parent representative played 
only a minor role in validating the implementation of the criteria.  Decisions were mainly taken by the school 
officials. 
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parent families. Also, a minimum of 50 percent of the scholarships, if at all possible, were 
to be allocated to girls.  
In the health programs, meanwhile, the free medical and family planning services 
program was implemented by giving ‘health cards’ to eligible households. Eligibility was 
also based on BKKBN household status. A health card given to a household could be used 
by all members of the household to obtain free services from designated hospitals, clinics, 
and health care centers for all medical and family planning purposes, including pregnancy 
check-ups and child-birth services.  
 
IV.  Measuring the Outcomes of Targeting 
In a program using targeted intervention, the success and failure of the program in 
meeting its objective is determined very much by the accuracy of the targeting that actually 
occurs in practice. A simple measure of targeting outcomes is illustrated in Table 2. This 
reveals that for a program which provides benefits targeted to the poor, there are two 
possible successful outcomes and two possible negative outcomes. The successful 
outcomes are when the poor participate in the program and when the non-poor do not 
participate in the program. Conversely the negative outcomes arise when the poor do not 
participate in the program (an exclusion error) and when the non-poor participate in the 
program (an inclusion error).  
 
 Poverty Status  
Poor Non-poor 
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 i
n
 P
ro
g
ra
m
 
Participant 
Success 
 
 
 
10 
Type II 
(inclusion) 
error 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
40 
Non-participants 
Type I 
(exclusion) 
error 
 
10 
Success 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
60 
  
20 
 
80 
 
100 
 
 
Table 2.  Targeting Outcomes 
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The numbers provided in Table 2 are taken from the implementation of the 
subsidized rice program in Indonesia.
9
 The figures shows that the “success rate” of this 
program is (10 + 50)/100 = 60 percent, while its “error rate” is (10 + 30)/100 = 40 percent. 
The numbers in the figure can also be used as the basis for calculating two other widely 
used targeting measures: “undercoverage” and “leakage”. Undercoverage refers to the 
fraction of people who actually need assistance but who are not covered by a program, 
while leakage refers to the fraction of program benefits which flow to those who actually 
do not need assistance. In this subsidized rice program, the undercoverage is 10/20 = 50 
percent, while the leakage is 30/40 = 75 percent.  
Instead of undercoverage and leakage, sometimes it is easier to just assess program 
coverage among the target and non-target population. For example, Table 3 shows the 
coverage of the Indonesian social safety net programs across quintiles of per capita 
expenditure, where the first quintile is defined as the poor. The subsidized rice program 
stands out as the program with the highest level of coverage. More than a half of all poor 
households in Indonesia reported receiving the benefits of this program, while more than a 
third of non-poor households also reported receiving the benefits. The second highest 
coverage is found in the nutrition program. Around 16 percent of both poor and non-poor 
households reported receiving the benefits of this program. Meanwhile, two programs with 
the lowest coverage are the primary and upper secondary school scholarships programs. In 
both, only around 5 percent of poor students reported receiving the scholarships.  
The coverage of the subsidized rice program indicates that nationally 40 percent of 
over 50 million households all over Indonesia are estimated to have received the benefits 
of this program during the six months evaluation period. However, the distribution of the 
benefits of this program does not seem to have been specifically directed towards the poor. 
The coverage of this program among the poor was 52.6 percent, while the coverage among 
the non-poor was relatively high at 36.9 percent. 
In the employment creation programs, the data indicate that 5.6 percent of 
households have at least one member who participated in a padat karya program. Program 
coverage among poor households is 8.3 percent compared to 4.9 percent among non-poor 
households. The significant participation of non-poor households in padat karya programs  
is probably a reflection of the level of wages offered by these programs. The average daily 
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wage received by the participants of padat karya programs was Rp. 6,073. While this is 
significantly lower than the average daily wage in the construction sector, which according 
to the 1999 National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) was Rp. 13,755, it was comparable to 
the daily wages in the food crop sector, which averaged at Rp. 6,350. The level of wages 
received and the average number of working day of participating households imply that 
each program participant on average received benefits of around Rp. 27,500 per month 
from the program. 
For the primary scholarships program, Table 3 shows that the program coverage 
among poor students is only 5.8 percent, compared to 3.6 percent coverage among non-
poor students. In the lower secondary school scholarships program, the program coverage 
among poor students is only 12.2 percent, compared to 7.5 percent coverage among non-
poor students. Meanwhile, in the upper secondary school scholarships program, the 
program coverage among poor students is only 5.4 percent, compared to 3.3 percent 
coverage among non-poor students. 
In the medical services program, the data indicate that of all the people who 
underwent medical treatment, 6.3 percent used health cards to obtain free services. Among 
the poor, the proportion of those who used health cards is 10.6 percent, while among the 
non-poor 5.3 percent also used health cards to obtain the benefits of this program. 
Meanwhile, the coverage of supplementary food for pregnant women and for children 
under three is 15.9 percent. Among the poor, 16.5 received the benefits of this program, 
while coverage among the non-poor is only slightly lower at 15.8 percent.
10
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 It seems that there is no relationship between receiving supplementary food and ownership of a health card. 
Of those who received supplemen food, only 17 percent reported owning a health card. 
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Table 3.  Coverage of Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs Across Quintiles of Expenditure 
 
Program 
Eligible 
recipients 
Program Coverage (%) 
Poor Non-Poor 
Total 
Q1 - Q5 
Ratio 
non-poor 
to Poor 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Total 
Q2 - Q5 
Subsidized Rice 50,385,444 52.64 46.24 41.71 35.76 24.33 36.90 40.09 0.70 
Employment Creation 50,385,444 8.31 6.89 5.79 4.58 2.53 4.94 5.61 0.59 
Primary School Scholarships 29,745,369 5.80 4.84 4.02 3.52 2.04 3.60 4.03 0.62 
Lower Secondary School Scholarships 10,394,621 12.15 10.31 8.34 6.73 4.85 7.53 8.42 0.62 
Upper Secondary School Scholarships 6,430,146 5.40 5.06 3.32 3.04 1.96 3.32 3.71 0.62 
Medical Services 27,567,138 10.60 7.24 6.30 4.52 3.09 5.28 6.33 0.50 
Nutrition 19,970,948 16.54 16.64 16.38 15.94 14.24 15.79 15.94 0.95 
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Undercoverage and leakage can be recalculated from coverage among the target 
and non-target population. Undercoverage is calculated as one minus coverage among the 
target population. Meanwhile, leakage is equal to coverage among the non-target 
population times the number of non-target population divided by coverage among the 
target population times the number of target population plus coverage among the non-
target population times the number of non-target population. Overall, Table 3 indicates a 
large degree of undercoverage as well as with considerable leakage in the Indonesian 
social safety net programs.  
Assessing targeting outcomes based on the coverage among the target and non-
target population perhaps does not do justice to the program implementers. The results may 
also be sensitive to the threshold separating the target and non-target population. Hence, 
assessing targeting outcomes based on the coverage among several groups in the 
population may give a more comprehensive picture of the targeting efforts. 
Figure 2 shows the coverage across quintiles relative to the level of coverage at the 
poorest quintile. Hence, a steeper curve indicates a sharper targeting across per capita 
expenditure. It appears that the best and worst targeting are both found in the health 
programs. The medical services program has the sharpest targeting, while the nutrition 
program has the least effective targeting. In the medical services program, coverage 
dropped sharply in the second quintile and then dropped gradually from the third to the 
richest quintile. Actually, the coverage of the employment creation program at the richest 
quintile relative to the poorest quintile was almost as low as that in the medical services 
program, but the drops in the program coverage across quintiles were more gradual. There 
was also a notable drop in the coverage of the upper secondary school scholarship program 
from the second to the third quintile.  
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Figure 2.  Program Coverage of Various JPS Programs Relative to Q1 
 
 
In the sale of subsidized rice program, coverage at the highest quintile is still quite 
high, with almost a quarter of the households in the richest group still receiving the 
program benefits. This is almost half of the level of coverage at the poorest quintile. 
Meanwhile, the proportion of households at the richest quintile that participated in a padat 
karya program is 30 percent of the participation at the poorest quintile. For other programs, 
coverage at the highest quintile relative to coverage at the lowest quintile is 35 percent for 
primary school scholarships, 40 percent for lower secondary school scholarships, 37 
percent for upper secondary school scholarships, 29 percent for medical services, and 86 
percent for the nutrition program. 
 
V.  Lessons Learned from Indonesia’s Targeting Experience 
Targeting the beneficiaries of social safety net, social protection, or poverty 
reduction programs requires detailed administrative guidance as well as community 
involvement if it is to be both effective as well as socially and politically acceptable. The 
previous section, which discussed the issue of targeting in the Indonesian social safety net 
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Quintiles
P
ro
g
ra
m
 C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 R
e
la
ti
v
e
 t
o
 Q
1
Sale of Subsidized Rice
Primary School Scholarship
Lower Secondary School
Scholarship
Upper Secondary School
Scholarship
Employment Creation
Medical Services
Nutrition
  
18 
programs, suggests that there are several useful lessons to be learned about the ways in 
which targeting does or does not have the desired effect.  
First, the Indonesian experience shows that the capacity of the government or 
donors to respond to shocks with effective geographic targeting was hampered by a lack of 
up to date, complete, and accurate data. This is why reliable information is vital. Static 
administrative targeting is unable to catch the newly poor or shocked households. When 
the crisis hit Indonesia, there were conflicting projections and differing assessments of the 
probable social impact. A well-designed, publicly accessible, real-time information system 
could might have assisted those efforts to address the needs of either the traditionally poor 
or the newly poor resulting from the crisis. Such a system, complemented by data from 
other organizations, including NGOs and donor agencies, could play a key role in 
combating the negative effects of a crisis.  
Second, designing and implementing large social safety net programs in a crisis 
situation requires institutional commitment at the central government level, supported by 
clear objectives and simple design. Implementation in the regions depends upon the 
capacity of local government and local community groups. At this level, clear targeting 
criteria and a reliable decision-making process are crucial to the effectiveness of the 
program. 
Third, although a simple design is important, there must still be some allowance for 
local flexibility in countries of the size and complexity of Indonesia. The OPK program is 
an example of a crisis initiative that worked relatively well. It had a simple design using 
the BULOG distribution channels to provide rice at subsidized prices to those with a 
BKKBN ‘poor card’. However, the experience revealed that centrally planned 
administrative guidelines often proved socially unacceptable at the community level. 
Pressure at the local level for a ‘fairer’ distribution of the rice was overwhelming, since the 
‘almost poor’ or the ‘newly poor’ families had no official entitlement to the subsidized 
rice. These arguments are quite compelling and raise important questions about the 
structure of ‘optimal’ targeting. It may well be that communities knew better than the 
central government and that the official classification may not have captured those who 
really needed the rice within any given community. Hence it is possible that some of what 
was recorded as going to those who are “non-eligible” is not really mis-targeting, but is a 
justifiable correction of the official eligibility criteria.  
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However, it is also possible that local social pressures have led to uniform or equal 
distribution simply as the only allocation that is perceived to be ‘fair’. The danger is that 
this may result in a simple ‘equal’ distribution which, given the fixed total amount of rice 
available, results in a lesser benefit for the poor. In the fiscal year 1999/2000, the 
procedures for determining eligible households were expanded to allow for local flexibility 
and the addition of households to the list, combined with procedures for publicizing such a 
list (for example, through discussion at a local open meeting). This was intended to allow 
necessary local flexibility while at the same time preventing a completely uniform 
distribution. It appears that the emergence of flexibility during the implementation of this 
program actually improved targeting and in April 2000 the program design was changed to 
take this into account. 
Fourth, one lesson to emerge from the employment creation programs in Indonesia  
is that in order to be effective wage rates should be set below the prevailing market rate. 
This will allow for the element of  ‘self selection’ since only those in serious difficulty will 
be willing to work for the low wages being offered. 
Fifth, a notable feature of the coverage and targeting of the various social safety net 
programs in Indonesia has been the heterogeneity of performance both across programs as 
well as across regions. Three factors have presumably contributed to this: (i) different 
types of program design, (ii) variation in the scale of budget allocations across programs 
and regions, and (iii) local or regional capacity in program implementation. In addition, 
other factors such as active monitoring and supervision by communities may also enhance  
the performance of a program in a particular region. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
We have discussed briefly that targeting is very important but it is not nearly as 
easy as is often suggested. Besides administrative cost, targeting also entails additional 
costs including disincentive costs, stigma costs, and political economy costs. Therefore, it 
is possible that targeted intervention is more costly than universal one. Targeting is only 
consider beneficial when the benefits outweigh the costs.   
We have shown how targeting practice was applied to Indonesia. The Indonesian 
social safety net programs were intended to protect both the traditionally poor and the 
newly poor who were unable to cope with impact of the crisis without external assistance. 
The programs were based on four strategies: (i) ensuring the availability of food at 
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affordable prices for the poor, (ii) supplementing purchasing power among poor 
households through employment creation, (iii) preserving access to critical social services, 
particularly health and education, and (iv) sustaining local economic activity through 
regional block grant programs and extension of small scale credits.  
In general, the targeting for these programs was based on a combination of 
geographic and household targeting mechanisms, except for the subsidized rice program 
which used only household targeting. The targeting for some programs was based on a 
household classification created by the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency 
(BKKBN). According to this classification, households are divided into four socio-
economic status groups: ‘pre-prosperous households’ (“keluarga pra-sejahtera” or KPS), 
‘prosperous I households’ (“keluarga sejahtera I” or KS I), KS II, and KS III. The KS I to 
KS III categories are often lumped together as the KS or ‘prosperous’ category. 
The success of individual programs can be summarized as follows: the subsidized 
rice program secured the highest coverage, while the upper secondary school scholarship 
program had the lowest coverage. In terms of targeting, the medical services program has 
the sharpest targeting, while the nutrition program has the least targeting. It is also 
important to note that the findings of this study apply to a given period of time. Program 
performance may change  either improve or worsen  across time.  
 As a result of our analysis of the relative success of meeting the program 
objectives, the following two key conclusions can be drawn: 
First, when a crisis hits a country without a history of effective social security 
programs, people will rely on traditional coping strategies such as families, friends, 
communities and their own individual initiatives. These informal coping mechanisms are 
often insufficient to mitigate the worst affects of a crisis and spending on formal social 
safety nets during a time of crisis must rise. The future direction of social safety nets in 
Indonesia will continue to be key challenge.  
Second, and unfortunately, in many cases the target groups of beneficiaries have 
been largely missed by the programs, both in terms of low coverage and being only loosely 
targeted in practice. All programs were plagued by the problems of how to target the 
beneficiaries and how to deliver benefits effectively to the intended target groups. Except 
for the subsidized rice program, there was a serious problem of undercoverage, as a large 
number of the poor were simply not covered by the programs. At the same time, all  
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programs faced the problem of leakage, since a large proportion of program benefits went 
to the non-poor.  
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